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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISMISSAL OF PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHER-REFUSAL To ANSWER QUESTIONS
AS TO COMMUNIST ACTIVITY.
Beilan v. Board of Education (U.S. 1958)
The petitioner, a public school teacher, was discharged by the local
school board for incompetency' because of his continued refusal, after
warning that failure to answer might lead to his dismissal, to answer a
question of his superintendent as to his membership in a Communist
political association. The petitioner had also invoked the fifth amendment
in refusing to answer similar questions asked him by a congressional sub-
committee. The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, held that the due process clause was not violated
by petitioner's discharge on the ground of incompetency, evidenced by his
refusal to grant the superintendent's request for information as to the
petitioner's loyalty and his activities in certain subversive organizations.
Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 359 (1958).2
A state or its governmental subdivisions may not, without violating
the due process clause, dismiss a public employee pursuant to a statute
which is patently discriminatory or arbitrary and thus a state may not
exclude persons from public employment pursuant to a statute which
permits such solely on the basis of organizational memberships without
regard to knowledge of the unlawful character of the organizations.3 A
state may, however, dismiss public employees who, after proper notice and
hearing, are found to advocate the overthrow of the government by un-
1. Section 1122 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code provides that: "The
only valid causes for termination of a contract heretofore or hereafter entered into
with a professional employee shall be immorality, incompetency, intemperance, cruelty,
persistent negligence, mental derangement, persistent and wilful violation of the school
laws of this Commonwealth on the part of the professional employee." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 1122 (Supp. 1957).
Incompetency has been construed by the Pennsylvania courts as subject to a
broad interpretation and has been held to embrace not only a lack of substantive
knowledge of the subjects to be taught, but also a want of physical ability as well
as a loss of standing in the community resulting from conduct outside the classroom.
Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township School Dist., 335 Pa. 369, 6 A.2d 866 (1939) ;
West Mahoney Township School Dist. v. Kelly, 156 Pa. Super. 601, 41 A.2d 344
(1945); Appeal of Schuer, 36 Pa. D. & C. 531 (C.P. 1939). See 2 VILL. L. Rgv.
418-19 (1957) for a discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation.
2. Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 359 (1958).
3. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
(270)
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RECENT DECISIONS
lawful means or who are unable to explain satisfactorily membership in
organizations found to have that objective.4 Similarly, it may inquire
of public employees as to matters which relate to their continued fitness
to serve as public employees, including past and present membership in
the Communist Party and similar organizations, and may discharge em-
ployees who fail to disclose pertinent information which the supervising
authorities may require.5 However, a state may not infer guilt and dis-
charge public employees solely because they exercise their constitutional
privilege under the fifth amendment before a congressional investigating
committee.6 The dismissal of the petitioner here, however, was not based
upon his refusal to answer during the hearing before the congressional
subcommittee but was, instead, based on a finding that he had refused
to answer questions relating to his fitness during an interview with his
administrative superior. 7
Mr. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, states that the findings of state
courts should be reviewed by the Supreme Court when the state court
refuses to recognize what has in fact occurred.8 He indicates that what
has in fact occurred here is that the petitioner was dismissed on the grounds
of disloyalty.9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, unambiguously
declares that the cause for the dismissal was not disloyalty but was, in-
stead, incompetency, reasoning that the failure to answer the questions
asked displayed a lack of frankness and candor on the part of the petitioner,
and the qualities of frankness and candor are traits desirable in a teacher. 10
Despite the fact that the question asked of the petitioner related to his
loyalty, the issue as to whether refusal to answer such a question would
be included under the statutory definition of incompetency" would seem
to be peculiarly the function of the courts of Pennsylvania.12 Granting,
however, that petitioner was not dismissed because of inferences of dis-
loyalty drawn from his failure to answer questions concerning his loyalty,
Mr. Justice Brennan suggests that the community will believe that peti-
4. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
5. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
6. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
7. Beilan v. Board of Education, 386 Pa. 82, 94, 125 A.2d 327, 333 (1956) ; aff'd
357 U.S. 359 (1958). In the following cases, Massachusetts, New York and New
Jersey, respectively, have dismissed teachers under similar circumstances: Faxon v.
School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954) ; Adler v. Wilson, 282 App.
Div. 418, 123 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dep't 1953) ; Laba v. Board of Education, 23 N.J.
364, 129 A.2d 273 (1957).
8. Beilan v. Board of Education, 78 Sup. Ct. 1311, 1329 (1958) (dissent).
9. Beilan v. Board of Education, supra note 8 at 1331.
10. "If the appellee had been charged with being a subversive, it may be con-
ceded that the Loyalty Act should have been employed, but this was not the charge.
Appellee was charged with incompetency based on his refusal to respond to a pertinent
inquiry as to his fitness to be a teacher." Beilan v. Board of Education, 386 Pa. 82,
88, 125 A.2d 327, 330 (1956) ; aff'd 357 U.S. 359 (1958) (Emphasis of the court).
11. See supra note 1.
12. See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 448 (1954). Chicago, M.,
St. P. & P. Ry. v. Risty, 276 U.S. 567, 570 (1928).
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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tioner was discharged for disloyalty thereby stamping him with a "badge
of infamy" 13 which would hinder his opportunity to earn a living in the
profession for which he is trained. In the instant case, however, the
questions were asked in privacy and the superintendent's records do not
indicate that the petitioner was considered to be disloyal. 14 Furthermore,
the label placed on the petitioner is that of incompetent rather than dis-
loyal. 15 Assuming, however, that the petitioner will be stamped with a
"badge of infamy" as a result of his dismissal, it would still be necessary
to show that he was not accorded due process in order to compel the find-
ing that he was improperly dismissed. In determining whether due process
was accorded petitioner, it is necessary to consider whether the privilege
against self-incrimination is necessary to due process in this situation.1'
Despite the difference of opinion as to the use of the privilege,' 7 it would
seem that all would agree that it was not designed to excuse a teacher from
being candid where the teacher is being questioned in private by his ad-
ministrative superior with regard to whether he is competent.' 8 The Court
has recognized this in the instant case in acknowledging that Pennsylvania
may dismiss a teacher who fails to adhere to the high standards which the
Commonwealth demands of its teachers, one of these standards being that
of frankness and candor. If Konigsberg v. State Bar,19 a case which in-
volved a similar refusal to answer a question concerning Communist Party
activity, can be considered to have held that unfavorable inferences con-
cerning truthfulness and candor can not be drawn from the refusal to
answer such a question itself, where that refusal was in good faith because
based on the belief that the United States Constitution prohibited such
type of inquiry,20 then that decision should be seriously reconsidered in
light of the decision in the instant case.
David H. Moskowitz
13. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952).
14. See Record, pp. 81a, 88a (Opinion of Superintendent of Public Instruction,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as to Haas, November 18, 1954).
15. Compare with Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (subway conductor
was dismissed under New York's Security Risk Law).
16. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), where the Court indicates
that it will not broaden the interpretation of the self-incrimination provision to include
anything more than protection against actual prosecution.
17. For attacks upon the use of the self-incrimination privilege, see HOOK, Com-
MON SENSE AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1957) ; Williams, Problems of the Fifth
Amendment, 24 FORDHAM L. REv. 19 (1955) ; and Baker, Self-Incrimination: Is the
Privilege an Anachronism, 42 A.B.A.J. 633 (1956). For defenses of the use of the
privilege against self-incrimination, see GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY
(1955) ; and Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today, 39 MARQ. L. Rev. 148 (1955-56)..
18. See supra note 16. Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, Proceedings 111 (1953);
Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, Proceedings 115 (1954); Ass'n of Am. Law Schools,
Program and Reports of Committees 41 (1956) ; Academic Freedoms and Tenure in.
the Quest for National Security, 42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 49 (1956).
19. 353 U.S. 252 (1957). See 3 VILL. L. REv. 93 (1957).
20. Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra note 19 at 270. It is questionable whether
the Court's statement on this problem was dictum or whether it was necessary to
the holding.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM To TRAVEL-BELIEFS AND
ASSOCIATIONS No BASIS FOR DENYING PASSPORTS.
Kent v. Dulles (U.S. 1958)
Separate actions were instituted against the Secretary of State by
Rockwell Kent and Walter Briehl in the District Court for the District
of Columbia for declaratory judgments that plaintiffs were entitled to pass-
ports.' Both complaints were dismissed, and the dismissals were upheld
by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard
both cases together. In each case petitioner had been denied a passport
because of alleged Communist affiliations and for failure to supply an
affidavit as to whether he was then or ever had been a Communist. With
four justices dissenting, the Supreme Court reversed the holding of the
court of appeals and held that Congress had not given the Secretary of
State authority to withhold passports from citizens because of their beliefs
and associations.2 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).3
Freedom to travel within the United States is recognized as a funda-
mental right of national citizenship and a liberty guaranteed by the Con-
stitution.4 Freedom to travel outside the United States has also been found
to be a protected personal liberty ;5 so that it has been held to be a violation
of due process to deny a United States citizen permission to leave the
Canal Zone after he had complied with all the regulations for departure.0
These decisions, however, did not resolve the question of whether the
right to travel includes the right to a passport.7 Previously, when most
1. Kent wanted to visit England and attend a meeting of an organization known
as the "World Council of Peace." Briehl, a psychiatrist, wished to attend a pyscho-
analytic congress in Geneva and a World Mental Health Organization Congress in
Istanbul.
2. The applicable statutory provisions are: "The Secretary of State may grant
and issue passports . . . under such rules as the President shall designate and pre-
scribe ... and no other person shall grant, issue or verify such passports." 44 STAT.
887, 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1926); "When the United States is at war or during the
existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President . . . it shall . . . be
unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to
depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport." 66 STAT.
190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952). The proclamation necessary to implement the restric-
tions of this Act was issued by President Truman on January 17, 1953. 67 STAT. c31,
Proc. No. 3004 (1953).
3. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
4. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) ; Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270
(1900); Crandal v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
5. Schachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Bauer v. Acheson,
106 F. Supp. 445, 451 (D.D.C. 1952). See also UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ov HUMAN
RIGHTS, art. 13, ff 2: "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country." Contra, Note, 3 STAN. L. REv. 312 (1952), in
which the constitutional right to international travel is denied.
6. Walker v. Chief Quarantine Officer, 69 F. Supp. 980 (D. Canal Zone 1943).
7. For an interesting article affirming this right by the attorney who argued the
Kent case, see Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. Rev. 47
(1956).
WINTER 1958-59]
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countries did not require a passport for exit or entry,8 a passport was
merely a request to foreign governments to allow the bearer to pass safely
through their territory; as such, a passport was a political document en-
tirely within the discretion of the Secretary of State to grant or refuse.9
Today, however, when foreign travel is impossible without a passport, 10
a refusal by the Secretary of State to grant a passport is subject to judicial
review, because it interferes with freedom of travel.1 Using this power
of review, the court of appeals has declared a refusal by the Secretary of
State to grant a passport to an applicant because he was chairman of an
organization on the Attorney General's subversive list to be a violation
of due process. 12 Similarly, the revocation of the passport of an American
correspondent working in France was struck down because she had not
been granted a proper hearing. 13 Prior to the passage of section 211a in
1926, passports had been refused principally for two reasons: lack of
allegiance to the United States, and illegal conduct. Although the discre-
tionary power over passports granted to the Secretary of State in section
211a is expressed in broad terms, the Court in the present case held that
the only grounds for refusal authorized by this act are those established
by previous administrative practice; and that this discretionary power has
not been extended by section 1185 which makes a passport necessary for
departure and authorizes the Secretary of State to issue them.14
The instant case marks the first time that the Supreme Court has
expressly recognized that the crucial function of a passport is control
over exit, that the right of exit is included in the liberties protected by
the fifth amendment, and that the denial of a passport must be for reasons
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. 15 By ruling that
Congress has not given the Secretary of State authority to refuse pass-
ports to Kent and Briehl on the basis of their beliefs and associations,
the Court has left unanswered the question of whether Congress can con-
stitutionally delegate such authority to the Secretary of State. However,
8. Prior to World War I only Persia, Roumania, Russia and Serbia required
a passport for exit or entry. 12 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 1066 (1945).
9. Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835) ; 3 HACKWORT', DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL. LAW, § -268 (1941) ; 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 401 (2d rev.
ed. 1947) ; 23 Op. ATrY. GEN. 509 (1901) ; '13 Op. ATTY. GEN. 90 (1869).
10. See note 2 supra. Even if the United States were to drop its passport re-
quirements, it would still be impossible to enter most foreign countries without a
passport. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 171 n. 3 (1952).
11. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1938) ; Kraus v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 840 (D.C.
Cir. 1956) ; Boudin v. Dulles, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Schachtman v. Dulles,
225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cit. 1955) ; Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
12. Schachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
13. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952):
14. Kent v. Dulles, 78 Sup. Ct. 1113, 1119 (1958).
15. Kent v. Dulles, supra note 14 at 1118. The letter sent to Rockwell Kent in-
forming him that his passport application had been denied because "the Department
is not willing at this time to grant you passport facilities to any countries for any
purposes," illustrates the need for some judicial restraint on the Secretary of State's
discretionary power.
[VOL. 4.
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the Court's warning that it would be faced by serious constitutional ques-
tions if it were to hold that sections 1185 and 211a' 6 had given the Secre-
tary of State authority to refuse passports for ideological reasons, should
not be interpreted as casting doubt on Congress' power to deny passports
on such grounds or to delegate such power to the Secretary of State. The
serious constitutional questions referred to by the Court were undoubtedly
whether sections 1185 and 211a contained adequate standards to guide
the Secretary of State in applying the broad discretionary powers delegated
to him. This is evident from the Court's observation that the right of exit
can be regulated only by Congress, that any delegation of such authority
must contain standards adequate to meet constitutional requirements, and
that there are no express provisions in sections 1185 and 211a authorizing
passport refusals on ideological grounds. 17 Although the four dissenting
justices felt that the war-time powers were applicable in the instant case
because of the present cold war,18 it would not appear that Communism,
although a serious menace, poses such an imminent threat to our nation
today as was present in Korematsu v. United States,19 where the Supreme
Court allowed citizens of Japanese ancestry to be excluded from their
homes during World War II because there was a showing of the gravest
imminent danger to the public safety. Furthermore, it would not seem that
our national security requires that the Secretary of State be allowed to
refuse passports on ideological grounds, since our national security can be
adequately protected under the existing laws which permit the Secretary
of State to deny a passport to any applicant engaging in activity which
would violate the laws of the United States.2 0 There would appear to be
little reason why any citizen, even though a Communist, should be pre-
vented from going abroad on business which would be perfectly legal for
him to perform in the United States. If there is to be a limitation upon
constitutionally protected rights in the name of national security, there
should first be a clear indication that the exercise of these rights will in
some way affect our national security.
Patrick M. Ryan
16. See note 2 supra.
17. Kent v. Dulles, supra note 14 at 1120.
18. Kent v. Dulles, supra note 14 at 1126 (dissent).
19. 323 U.S. 214 (1942).
20. See Kent v. Dulles, supra note 14 at 1119.
WINTER 1958-59]
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CONTRACTS-IMPLIED OFFER FOR A UNILATERAL CONTRACT-
SUBSTANTIAL BREAK IN NEGOTIATIONS PRECLUDES RECOVERY
OF COMMISSIONS BY INDUSTRIAL BROKER.
Canaday v. Brainard (Del. 1958)
In 1950, defendant Canaday, who was president of Willys-Overland
Motors, requested an industrial broker, Vance, to find a buyer for his
stock in the company, but did not say at what price he would sell. In
1951, Brainard became associated with Vance, and after meeting with
defendant, began making efforts to produce a purchaser. Brainard thought
a sale of the stock could be made if Willys would first merge with the
Kaiser-Frazer Company, with whom defendant had negotiated in 1950,
these negotiations having failed because defendant insisted on a firm com-
mittment to buy his holdings. Brainard told Kaiser that defendant was
interested in a merger, and Kaiser contacted defendant. Defendant en-
couraged Brainard to negotiate with Kaiser, but shortly thereafter told
him not to pursue it any further. Defendant and Kaiser met in Septem-
ber, 1951, and had a general discussion on the possibility of merger, but
the discussions went no further at that time because of Kaiser's dissatis-
faction with the sales prospects of Willys' new car. In January, 1953,
Kaiser submitted a plan to defendant, and the sale of Willys' assets to a
subsidiary of Kaiser-Frazer resulted, defendant subsequently disposing
of his stock for a sum probably exceeding seventeen million dollars.
Brainard's representative, and Vance, brought this action to recover either
commissions, alleging performance of an agreement that defendant would
pay them if they found a purchaser for his holdings, or, the reasonable
value of their services, alleging that they were wrongfully prevented by
defendant from consummating a sale - Vance, because defendant would
never put a price upon the stock, and Brainard, because he was instructed
not to follow up the Kaiser-Frazer deal. Plaintiffs were awarded a verdict
for commissions, from which the defendant appealed. The Delaware Su-
preme Court reversed and held that there was not sufficient evidence to
justify the finding that there was no substantial break in negotiations
started by Brainard and resulting in the sale, and therefore Brainard could
not have been the procuring cause of the sale as was required for recovery.
Further, the court found that the defendant had not prevented performance
because he was not bound to name a price to a prospect under the terms
of his offer to Vance, and that Brainard could not recover for his alleged
discharge in bad faith without showing that a sale was consummated as
the result of his efforts. Canaday v. Brainard, 144 A.2d 240 (Del. 1958).1
A contract of employment, either express or implied, is necessary to
entitle a broker to compensation for services rendered.2 A prerequisite to
1. Canaday v. Brainard, 144 A.2d 240 (Del. 1958).
2. Ford v. Gibson, 191 Va. 96, 59 S.E.2d 867 (1950).
[VOL. 4.
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the existence of such a contract is an offer, definite and certain in its
terms.3 Since no express contract was made in the instant case, one had
to be implied from the circumstances before the plaintiff could recover.
Before the court can infer an offer to a broker, however, there is a ques-
tion whether the offer is definite and certain where the broker is not given
the essential terms upon which a sale is to be made. In cases where the
broker is given all of the essential terms upon which the seller wishes
to sell, the offer impliedly requests the broker to produce a buyer who is
ready, willing, and able to buy on those terms.4 However, such can not
be inferred where the essential terms are not given. One court has held,
therefore, that no offer was made to a real estate broker who was not
given the terms on which to find a buyer.5 Another court has held, how-
ever, that there may be an offer where all of the terms are not disclosed
upon which a sale is to be made, the terms of the offer being that the
broker is to produce a prospective purchaser who subsequently shall meet
the owner's terms.6 Whether the offer requests a return promise or an
act is another element to be determined from the circumstances, the court
in the instant case finding that there was an offer for a unilateral contract.
In many cases of offers for unilateral contracts, part performance has
been held to constitute acceptance of the offer, resulting in either a bi-
lateral contract, 7 or a unilateral contract with completion of performance
as a condition precedent to the offeror's duty to perform.8 However, the
offer in the instant case was found to call for a non-exclusive, independent
agency relationship9 rather than for ordinary employment, and few courts
have held that a doctrine of partial performance applies to such offers of
non-exclusive, independent agencies.' 0 Most courts have held, as the court
in the instant case, that the offer is revocable until the broker fully per-
forms." Once an offer for employment, such as that in the instant case,
is established, before the broker is entitled to commissions, he must show
that he was the procuring cause of the result for the accomplishment of
3. General Motors Corp. v. Keener Motors, Inc., 194 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1952).
This case held that an offer must be so definite in its terms that promises and per-
formances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain.
4. Simmons v. Libbey, 53 N.M. 362, 208 P.2d 1070 (1949).
5. McCoy v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 204 N.C. 721, 169 S.E. 644 (1933).
6. Strout Loan Agency, Inc. v. De Forest, 192 App. Div. 790, 183 N.Y. Supp.
119 (3d Dep't 1920).
7.. Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086 (1902);
Abbott v. Stephany Poultry Mkt., 44 Del. 513, 62 A.2d 243 (1948).
8. Harris v. McPherson, 97 Conn. 164, 115 Att. 723 (1922); Frank v. Myers,
232 Mo. App. 681, 109 S.W.2d 54 (1937); Hutchison v. Dobson-Bainbridge Realty
Co., 217 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1946) (a case involving an offer for an ex-
clusive agency) ; R STATFMENT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932).
9. A non-exclusive, independent agent is one who is employed to achieve a re-
sult, and his compensation is contingent upon his accomplishing this result, though
he is given no exclusive rights to achieve it. See, Mxciatm OUTLINZS AGZNCY § 563
(4th ed. 1952).
10. For a case appearing to adopt such a theory see Grossman v. Calonia Land
& Improvement Co., 103 N.J.L. 98, 134 At. 740 (1926).
11. See Wood v. Hutchison Coal Co., 85 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. W. Va. 1949).
WINTER 1958-59]
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which the owner had promised to pay him.' 2 Procuring cause is generally
defined to mean that the broker's initial efforts in calling the buyer's atten-
tion to the property shall have set in motion a series of events which,
without a break in their continuity, eventually culminate in the accom-
plishment of the objective of the employment of the broker.' 3 Whether the
broker is the procuring cause of sale is said to depend on the particular
circumstances of each case, and is normally a question of fact for the
jury,14 the court in the instant case holding that since the only inference
possible was that there was a substantial break in negotiations, as a matter
of law, the plaintiff could not have been the procuring cause of the sale.' 5
Although the court in the instant case might have held that plaintiffs
were not entitled to compensation because there was no offer of employ-
ment definite in its terms, it found that price in itself was merely a term
of the offer for the sale of the stock and it was in defendant's discretion
to set the terms for the prospect. This would appear proper since the
owner of the stock was also president of the corporation, and better able
to bargain as to a merger, or as to the value of the stock itself. Further-
more, because of the particular facts of the brokerage situation, the doctrine
of partial performance should have no application here, although it had
been previously adopted in the jurisdiction.' 6 In brokerage situations
such as the one involved here, the prospective commission is usually far
out of proportion to the reasonable value of the efforts involved; therefore,
in addition to there being no restitutionary interest until the sale is con-
summated, there is no reliance interest to be protected as in cases where
there is a detriment incurred which is substantial in proportion to the
promised compensation.' 7 In addition, it would appear that the only in-
ference that could be drawn from the facts was that, as a matter of law,
there was a substantial break in negotiations. The determination by the
court that whether there is a substantial break in the negotiations depends
more on the chain of circumstances than on lapse of time is particularly
important in cases such as the instant one where the owner is to negotiate
rather than the broker, as the owner could easily simulate a lapse of time
by prolonging negotiations. If the court had wished to allow plaintiffs to
recover for efforts made, it could have done so by finding an offer for
12. Slaughter v. Stafford, 141 A.2d 141 (Del. 1958).
13. Clark v. Ellsworth, 66 Ariz. 119, 184 P.2d 821 (1947) ; Hoke v. Marcis, 127
N.E.2d 54 (Ohio 1955).
14. "Ordinarily this is a question of fact for the jury, since its resolution must
often depend on a choice of possible inferences." Canaday v. Brainard, 144 A.2d 240,
244 (Del. 1958).
15. The court said: "Whether there was a substantial break in the negotiations
depends not so much on lapse of time as upon the chain of circumstances - the
question of causation." Canaday v. Brainard, 144 A.2d 240, 244 (Del. 1958).
16. Abbott v. Stephany Poultry Mkt., 44 Del. 513, 62 A.2d 243, 246 (1948),
where the court held that before applying the doctrine, it is necessary to weigh the
equities.
17. See note 16 supra, where the offeree incurred a detriment clearly substantial
in proportion to the expected compensation.
[VOL. 4.
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ordinary employment rather than independent agency and commissions,
though it would have had to strain to do so since such relief could not
have been sought by plaintiffs on appeal, and most brokerage agreements
are on a commission basis.
Charles C. Keeler
LABOR LAW-SECONDARY BOYCOTT-DEFENSE BASED ON
"HOT CARGO" CLAUSE.
Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL v. N.L.R.B.
(U.S. 1958)
Members of Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL,
had a collective bargaining contract with a general contractor which con-
tained a "hot cargo" clause,1 and under the terms of that clause, the union
workers refused to hang non-union doors which had been delivered to the
construction site, by a local distributor. The distributor instituted pro-
ceedings before the National Labor Relations Board on the grounds that
the union, representing the employees of the general contractor, had vio-
lated the secondary boycott provisions of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the
National Labor Relations Act.2 The Board held that there was a viola-
tion under this section, and the court of appeals enforced the Board's
cease and desist order. The Supreme Court in affirming the judgment
held that though the National Labor Relations Act did not bar the in-
clusion of a "hot cargo" clause in the collective bargaining contract, such
a clause did not constitute a valid defense for the union against the charge
of secondary boycott under section 8(b) (4) (A), since the secondary em-
ployer, here the general contractor, at the time the non-union doors were
to be hung, did not agree to comply with the "hot cargo" provision. Local
1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL v. N.L.R.B., 78 Sup. Ct.
1011 (1958).3
The Supreme Court has long recognized a basic distinction between
a primary boycott and a secondary boycott; the former being a refusal to
deal, or peacefully to persuade others not to deal, directly with complainant;
the latter being the exercise of coercive pressure upon the customers in
order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage from the com-
1. "Hot cargo" clauses are provisions of collective bargaining agreements by
which an employer agrees that his employees shall not be required to handle non-
union goods. Douds v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Workers, 133 F. Supp. 336 (N.J. 1955).
2. 61 STAT. 136, 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1952).
3. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL v. N.L.R.B., 78 Sup. Ct.
1011 (1958).
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plainant.4 Primary boycotts, both by employers 5 and by labor,6 if peace-
fully carried on, have been held legal, the theory being that the right of
an individual to refuse to deal with another is generally as absolute as the
right of an individual to quit work in order to secure higher wages or
better working conditions. Initially under the Sherman Act, 7 and later
the Clayton Act,8 secondary boycotts either by employers, 9 or by labor,10
were found illegal where they interfered with interstate commerce, the
courts reasoning that such boycotts obstruct a free and open market, and
further that an innocent third party in an industrial conflict should not
be made, against his will, the ally of one party to the destruction of the
other." However, the Supreme Court in United States v. Hutcheson,
12
substantially modified the effect of previous decisions which had brought
union boycott activity within the prohibitions of anti-trust legislation. The
Court in that case felt that Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,'3
and a fair construction of Section 20 of the Clayton Act,'14 made secondary
boycotts by unions generally unenjoinable. 15 However, the Court in apply-
ing Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act has ruled
that secondary boycotts by unions are illegal and may be enjoined.' 6
Though the so-called "hot cargo" clause, a particular kind of secondary
boycott, has been held illegal under the Sherman Act as being against
public policy,'" the instant case is the first ruling on the application 'of
Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act to such clauses
by the Supreme Court.
In the instant case the Court rests its decision on a rather narrow
interpretation of the purpose of Congress in enacting Section 8(b) (4) (A)
of the National Labor Relations Act. The majority takes the view that
the evil aimed at is the coercion of neutral or secondary employers who
are not involved in a primary labor dispute. The Court is concerned that
the "hot cargo" agreement itself may have been forced initially upon the
4. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
5. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924);
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
6. Edelstein v. Gilmore, 35 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 607(1929).
7. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
8. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1952).
9. Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914);
Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
10. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37
(1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
11. Pacific Typesetting Co. v. International Typographical Union, 125 Wash.
273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923).
12. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
13. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952).
14. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1952).
15. However the dicta implies that the Court was still willing to apply the
Sherman Act to labor activities, if such activiting could be considered part of an
illegal combination with non-labor groups in restraint of trade.
16. Local 74 United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 707 (1951);
N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
17. United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926).
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employer by strikes or other coercion, and, in effect, be a method whereby
the union can accomplish indirectly against the secondary employer that
which it cannot accomplish directly, thereby defeating the purpose of
Congress. Therefore, since the purpose of the act is the protection of the
neutral or secondary employer, the Court found that he cannot waive this
protection by way of collective bargaining contracts. It should be noted,
however, that nothing appears in the language of the act, or in the con-
gressional debates18 which preceded its passage, which would indicate that
Congress felt that an employer needed protection against his own collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Indeed, it is the essence of collective bargain-
ing that there may be threats of coercion, and yet the results of such
bargaining, as incorporated into the contract, should be, and generally are,
enforced, if not otherwise illegal under the act.19 As the dissenting opinion
points out, the holding of the instant case is capricious in that it deems a
secondary boycott lawful where an employer agrees to abide by his con-
tract, but unlawful if he reneges.20 The effect of this decision is to make
such collective bargaining agreements illusory since the union may be
denied its bargained for consideration, i.e., the protection from non-union
competition that "hot cargo" provisions were meant to provide. Further,
as the dissent argued, the decision may well lay the foundation for an
expansion of industrial strife, as the employer's refusal to observe the
terms of the contract may be met with employee walkouts or other re-
prisals. The basis for this inconsistent position appears to be the Court's
desire to preserve for the employer the same commercial freedom he has
at all times absent such agreements.21 It would seem that the rationale of
the majority would be more compelling had it interpreted Section
8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act in connection with
the broader foundation of Section 1(b) of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947,22 which provides that the purpose and policy of that
act is to promote the full flow of commerce and protect the rights of the
public. Clearly, if the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 were
aimed at the protection of the public and of the market, the "hot cargo"
agreements with the union could not be enforced because the secondary
employer cannot waive the rights of others. Thus, it would follow that
"hot cargo" clauses would be illegal per se as against public policy, thereby
providing the protection for the public and the market which has been
missing since the Hutcheson case. Such a ruling would afford protection for
the neutral employers and their freedom of boycott with which the ma-
18. 93 CONG. Rsc. 4198 (1947).
19. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Alliance v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265,
30 So. 2d 696 (1947).
20. Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, AFL v. N.L.R.B., 78 Sup.
Ct. 1011, 1022 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
21. Where the secondary employer refuses to handle the goods of the primary
employer the relationship between these parties is one of primary boycott, and such
boycotts have been held legal. See note 5 supra.
22. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141(b) (1952).
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jority seems concerned; and finally, though the unions would lose the
benefits afforded by such clauses, they would at least be protected from
the effect of illusory contracts as they would know clearly that all such
agreements would not be enforced.
William B. Colsey, III
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY IN SALE OF FooD-NEcESSITY FOR
PRIVITY BETWEEN INFANT AND VENDOR WHERE
MOTHER IS THE PURCHASER.
Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1958)
This was an action for negligence and breach of warranty brought by
plaintiff, individually and as guardian ad litem for her two infant daughters.
Plaintiff purchased a sealed jar of jam from defendant which allegedly
contained worms, and when she and her two daughters ate the worms
they sustained injuries. When purchasing the jam, plaintiff did not dis-
close to the defendant the fact that she was making the purchase for the
benefit of her children. Mr. Justice Starke,1 speaking for the court, held
that there could be no recovery for negligence, but plaintiffs could recover
for breach of an implied warranty of fitness for purpose even though the
children were not in privity of contract with the seller. Parish v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Munic. Ct. 1958).2
The general rule in actions for breach of warranty by the consumer
against the vendor is that, without privity of contract between the parties,
recovery will not be granted.8 The courts, however, have used various
devices to allow recovery by a consumer against a retailer regardless
of privity of contract.4 Thus, New York has allowed recovery where a
husband was injured by consuming bread which his wife had purchased even
though the husband was not in privity with the retailer by applying a theory
of agency, holding the wife to be the husband's agent.5 In a similar situ-
ation, where the purchaser-wife was injured, the wife was held to be
acting in her own right and not as an agent.6 Where two sisters jointly
operated a household, sharing expenses, and one was injured consuming
food bought by the other, New York again allowed recovery, employing
the household fund theory in holding the purchaser to be the plaintiff's
agent even though the money used was shown not to be exclusively the
plaintiff's, but from a mutually created fund.7 A third party beneficiary
1. Mr. Justice Starke is the author of an article in the Niw YORK LAW JOURNAL
of April 8, 9, and 10, 1957, on the implied warranty of quality and wholesomeness in
the sale of food.
2. Parish v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 177 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Munic. Ct. 1958).
3. Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1922).
4. See COMMENT, 24 FORDHAM L. REv. 428-30 (1955).
5. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105, (1931).
6. Giminez v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934).
7. Bowman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 284 App. Div. 663, 133 N.Y.S.2d
904 (4th Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 308 N.Y. 780, 125 N.E.2d 165 (1954).
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theory was apparently applied in allowing recovery by the estate of a de-
ceased child where a cowboy suit purchased by the mother ignited causing
the child's death, the court found that the purchase was made by the
mother for the benefit of the child.8 Recently lower courts in New York,
including the court in the instant case, have allowed recovery in cases
against the retailer, under various theories, regardless of privity though
the court of appeals has not yet done so.9 The Uniform Commercial Code,
under the heading of third party beneficiaries, allows recovery by house-
hold members or guests of the buyer, against his seller even though they
are not in privity with each other, if it could be reasonably expected that
such persons would consume the food.10 Recovery against either the
manufacturer or the retailer, according to the fact situation, has been
allowed under similar theories in jurisdictions other than New York. Thus
it has been held that implied warranties run with the goods similar to
covenants running with the land," and that a warranty is created as a
matter of public policy for the benefit of the ultimate consumer.12
This is no longer the age of the small grocery store where placing an
insurer's liability on the vendor would be a great burden. It is the age
of the commercial giant upon whom the burden of guaranteeing foods
in sealed containers would cost little more than its outlay in trading
stamps, since businesses that are not capable of self-insuring could take
out appropriate insurance policies at reasonable cost.' 3 By increases in
prices to meet the cost of such insurance the burden could be spread over
8. Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
The court did not state what theory was used. If the child's money had been used
the mother would have been acting as the child's agent and therefore the agency
theory could have applied. If the mother's money was used the third party beneficiary
theory would have been appropriate. It is more likely, under the circumstances, that
it was the mother's money or at least the father's money, with the mother acting as
agent for the father, in making a contract for the benefit of the child.
9. See, e.g., Conklin v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria Corp., 5 Misc. 2d 496, 161
N.Y.S.2d 205 (City Ct. 1957). The court allowed recovery where plaintiff's friend
paid for her lunch in defendant's restaurant, stating that a contract was made by
both parties when the meal was ordered and the warranty arose then and it did not
matter who subsequently paid. In Welch v. Scheibelhuth, 6 Misc. 2d 466, 169 N.Y.S.2d
309 (Sup. Ct. 1957) the court allowed recovery by the husband, mother-in-law and
brother-in-law of a housewife who purchased a contaminated cake, stating that im-
plied warranties of wholesomeness in food cases are imposed by law and run to all
who partake of the goods.
10. UNIFORM COMMSRCIA,. CODS § 2-318 states: "A seller's warranty whether
express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household
of his buyer or who is a guest in his home . .. ."
11. Allowing recovery against the retailer are: Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co.,
38 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943), and Anderson v. Tyler, 233 Iowa 1033, 274
N.W. 48 (1937). Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 76, 111 So. 305(1927) (allowed recovery against the manufacturer). In Ladaro v. M.B.S. Cigar
Corp., 177 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Munic. Ct. 1958), a New York court recently allowed recovery
by the vendee of a retailer, against a manufacturer holding that the implied warranty
of quality and wholesomeness ran with the goods.
12. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920). See
Welch v. Scheibelhuth, 6 Misc. 2d 466, 169 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
13. For a discussion on food products liability insurance see DICKRSON PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND THr; FOOD CONSUM]-R (1951) 266-68.
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many people instead of resting upon a few retailers. Further, standards
of public health and public policy seem to demand that the warranty of
wholesomeness apply to all who consume the food and not just to the
immediate vendee. Although, the third party beneficiary theory could be
used to allow recovery in most of these instances against the retailer, the
theory would be strained if extended to allow recovery to the consumer
in situations where the food would be eaten by one not contemplated by
the vendee at the time of purchase, particularly when it can be shown that
the purchase was made for the benefit of another specific individual. It
would also appear that the agency theory would not apply in all cases,
since a host could not properly be called his guest's agent. Since warranties
existed before assumpsit, and recovery for breach of warranty could have
been had in either trespass or case, 14 there is now no reason why recovery
for breach of warranty should be made to depend on privity of contract.
Though the elimination of the requirement of privity in the instant case
is not authority for the elimination in New York of the requirement of
privity in actions for breach of warranty by the vendee against the manu-
facturer, if the requirement were generally eliminated on the grounds of
public policy, the consumer who did not purchase the food could recover
against the retailer and the vendee of the retailer could recover against
the manufacturer.' Such recovery by the consumer who is not the vendee
against the retailer can he had without satisfying the requirement of privity
in those states which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 and
relief by the vendee of the retailer against a manufacturer has already been
afforded under third party pleading as in section 193a of the New York
Civil Practice Act.' 7
John G. Hall
14. Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
15. There is another privity problem similar to the one in the instant case. It
is where the vendee tries to recover for his injuries from the manufacturer rather
than from his vendor. Some of the devices used to bypass this have been, the appli-
cation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to food cases. Miller v. National Bread
Co., 247 App. Div. 88, 286 N.Y.S. 908 (4th Dep't 1936) ; or holding that the manu-
facturer has made representations to the public at large and the consumer is entitled
to rely on them. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Worth v. Smith, 97 S.W.2d 761
(Tex. Civ. App. 1936); or treating the retailer as a mere conduit from the manu-
facturer to the consumer. Mazett v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633
(1913).
16. See note 10 supra. There is some doubt as to whether this provision would
cover a situation such as the one in Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139
N.E. 576 (1922), where an employee received her meals as part of her pay, and
was injured when she bit into a nail in a piece of cake sold by defendant to her
employer. This does not seem to fit into the member of the household or guest
exception to the privity requirement under the Uniform Commercial Code. However,
today plaintiff could probably recover by suing her employer for breach of warranty,
who could join the retailer. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 193a (1946).
17. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT § 193a (1946) states: "[A]fter the service of his answer,
a defendant may bring in a person not a party to the action, who is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him .... "
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TORTS-DAMAGES-RECOVERY ALLOWED FOR- MENTAL ANGUISH
RESULTING FROM FEAR OF CANCER.
Ferrara v. Galluchio (N.Y. 1958)
Plaintiff, who was suffering from bursitis in the right shoulder, re-
ceived a series of seven X-ray treatments from defendants who were doctors
specializing in X-ray therapy. Subsequent to the seventh treatment, the
shoulder began to itch, turned pink, then red, and blisters formed. These
blisters ruptured and the skin peeled, leaving the raw flesh of the shoulder
exposed. The defendants prescribed a salve for the condition which the
plaintiff procured and used. The condition was diagnosed as chronic radio-
dermatitis which was caused by X-ray therapy. Approximately two years
after the treatments, the plaintiff was referred to a dermatologist who, after
taking her history and examining her, prescribed a substance used in the
treatment of radiodermatitis and advised her to have her shoulder checked
every six months inasmuch as the area of the burn might become cancerous.
In this action for malpractice the plaintiff introduced, on the issue of dam-
ages for mental -anguish, the statement of the dermatologist to her thai
there was a possibility of cancer and the testimony of a neuro-psychiatrist
to the effect that she was suffering from a severe cancerophobia and that
she might have permanent symptoms of anxiety. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $25,000 of which $15,000 was to com-
pensate for the mental anguish flowing from the cancerophobia., The
decision of the appellate division upholding the judgment of the trial court
was affirmed by the court of appeals, with three judges dissenting, which
held that damages for mental anguish arising from the dermatologist's
statement are recoverable and that his statement was admissible in evi-
dence for the purpose of showing that there was a basis for the plaintiff's
anxiety. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958).2
Before mental suffering will be allowed as an element of damages,
the courts require that in the circumstances of the case there be some
guarantee of the genuineness of the plaintiff's claim which would tend to
counterbalance the risk of fraud attendant such claims.8 While the ma-
jority of courts view a physical illness resulting from the mental anguish
as being a sufficient guarantee,4 many courts, including New York," re-
1. The phobic apprehension that the cancer would ultimately develop in the site
of the radiation burn.
2. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958).
3. PROSSER, TORTS § 37 (2d ed. 1955).
4. HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS 1034 (1956) ; PRossER, TORTS 179 nn.18 & 19 (2d ed.
1955). Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, VA. L. Rev. 193, 207,
nn.31 & 32 (1940) (classifies states as to those which have impact requirements and
those which do not).
5. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) ; Mitchell v. Rochester
Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). But see Klumbach v. Silver Mount Cemetery
Ass'n, 242 App. Div. 843, 275 N.Y. Supp. 180 (2d Dep't 1934).
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quire that it be shown that at least an impact or a force from without acted
upon the plaintiff. 6 Once the test of genuineness has been met, the plain-
tiff is no longer, as a matter of policy, precluded from recovering;7 and
thus, the tortfeasor has been held liable for such consequences of his act
as intense psychoneurosis,8 anxiety neurosis,9 and post-traumatic neurosis. 10
Mental anguish occasioned by the victim's apprehension and anxiety over
what he believes to be the possible consequences of his injuries is also a
proper element of damages ;11 and recovery has been allowed for a preg-
nant woman's fear that her child might be born deformed ;12 for the appre-
hension of insanity ;18 a reasonable fear of blood poisoning ;14 anxiety that
injury might result in paralysis ;15 in death; x6 and also for the victim's
fear that the impact might result in cancer.' 7 It is not necessary that the
fear itself be reasonable in that it is founded upon a probability supported
by scientific fact, but only that it is reasonable for a jury to believe that
the fear or neurosis in fact exists.' 8 Recovery will not be allowed, however,
without sufficient evidence of the existence of the apprehension,'9 or where
the claim is so fantastic as to be unbelievable, 20 or where the fear persists
6. See note 4 supra. The requirement of impact has become little more than a
formality, it being satisfied by a slight jar, Comstock v. Wilson, supra note 5; a
blast of air filled with splinters, Sawyer v. Dougherty, 286. App. Div. 1061, 144
N.Y.S.2d 746 (3d Dep't 1955) ; or the inhalation of smoke, Morton v. Stack, 122
Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
7. See Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902).
Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MicH. L. Rtv. 497, 504 (1922).
8. Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948).
9. Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955).
10. Tracy v. Hotel Wellington Corp. 175 N.Y. Supp. 100 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1919) aff'd, 176 N.Y. Supp. 923 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1919).
11. Sherwood v. Chicago & N. M. Ry., 82 Mich. 374, 46 N.W. 773 (1890)
Webb v. Yonkers, 51 App. Div. 194, 64 N.Y. Supp. 491 (2d Dep't 1900) ; McCoRMICK,
DAMAGES § 88 (1935); 4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES 4651 (4th ed. 1916).
12. Bowley v. Duca, 80 N.H. 548, 120 At. 74 (1923) ; State v. McLaughlin, 47
N.J. Super. 271, 136 A.2d 22 (1957) ; Fehely v. Senders, 170 Or. 457, 135 P.2d 283
(1943); Rosen v. Yellow Cab, 162 Pa. Super. 58, 56 A.2d 398 (1948); Contra
Nevada v. Ironwood, 232 Mich. 316, 205 N.W. 93 (1925) (mere apprehensions are
outside realm of pecuniary compensation). But this decision of the Michigan court
is difficult to reconcile with Sherwood v. Chicago, supra note 11, and Main v. Grand
Rapids, G.T. & M.R.R., 207 Mich. 473, 174 N.W. 157 (1919).
13. Walker v. Boston & M.R.R., 71 N.H. 271, 51 Atl. 918 (1902).
14. Butts v. National Exchange Bank, 99 Mo. App. 168, 72 S.W. 1083 (1903);
Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251, (1880) (hydrophobia).
15. Smith v. Boston & M.R.R., 87 N.H. 246, 177 Att. 729 (1925).
16. Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152 (1905).
17. Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1951) ; Flood v. Smith, 126
Conn. 644, 13 A.2d 677 (1940); Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C.
327, 74 S.E. 885 (1912).
18. Dempsey v. Hartley, supra note 17; Smith v. Boston & M.R.R., 87 N.H.
246, 177 Atl. 729 (1925) ; Bowley v. Duca, 80 N.H. 548, 120 Atl. 74 (1923) ; Fehely
v. Senders, 170 Or. 457, 135 P.2d 283 (1943).
19. Lake Erie & W.R. Co. v. Johnson, 191 Ind. 479, 133 N.E. 732 (1922) (plain-
tiff's own description of his mental condition is insufficient where it is only basis for
assessing damages) ; Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 711, 98 S.W.2d 969
(1936) (there was no evidence of apprehension).
20. Smith v. Boston & M.R.R., 87 N.H. 246, 177 Atl. 729 (1925). Cf. St. Louis
Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. v. Buckner, 89 Ark. 58, 115 S.W. 923 (1909).
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even after its source or basis has been removed. 21 Nor will recovery be
allowed where the causal relationship is too tenuous, such as where mental
injury is caused by plaintiff's brooding over what might be the affect of
the injury on him and his family,2 2 and apprehension over the outcome of
the trial.23 In a recent New York decision recovery was allowed for mental
anguish and shock to the nervous system suffered by the plaintiff after
being advised of the probable consequences of the defendant's negligence.
24
In the instant case it is not disputed that the defendant has violated
a duty owed to the plaintiff and has thereby caused the plaintiff to be in-
jured; the problem is rather one of to what extent shall the defendant be
responsible for the harm which, has been caused. As stated in Milks v.
McIver,2 5 "liability . . . ceases at a point dictated by public policy. .. ."
But any determination of public policy must consider the right of the in-
jured party to be compensated for the ultimate result of the wrongdoer's
act. The principle announced in the instant case would appear to represent
the proper balance between the right to compensation and the danger of
undetected fraudulent claims. Recognizing that a policy which denies
relief in all cases out of a fear that a few claims might be fictitious places
undue weight on the latter consideration, the court properly treats the
problem as being one of adequate proof.2 6 Where the circumstances of
the case present some guarantee of the genuineness of the plaintiff's claim
so as to render it entirely plausable,27 a court will allow the plaintiff's
evidence, if otherwise sufficient, to go to the jury. This court, however,
while condemning an absolute prohibition against recovery for damages
such as are claimed here, is not suggesting that a plaintiff should be allowed
to recover for any damages which he might allege, but rather that each
case be determined as the facts may or may not indicate the genuineness of
the claim. The dissent's fear that this decision opens the door to increased
recovery should the patient merely claim to be concerned enough to suffer
worry over the doctor's statement, would seem to be unfounded since the
plaintiff here recovered not for the mere worry over the possible conse-
quences of her injury, but for a fear which developed into severe can-
21. Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152 (1905) (fear of
death from ground glass in stomach after glass had been removed).
22. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 46 Ariz. 162, 49 P.2d 391 (1935).
23. Coffey v. Coffey Laundries, Inc., 108 Conn. 493, 143 Atl. 880 (1928). Contra,
Skelly v. Sunshine Mining Co., 62 Idaho 192, 109 P.2d 622 (1941).
24. Berg v. New York Soc'y for the Relief of R. & C., 136 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Sup.
Ct. 1954), reild on other grounds, 286 App. Div. 783, 146 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1st Dep't
1955); Halloran v. New England Tel. & Telegraph Co., 95 Vt. 273, 115 Atl. 143
(1921). Cf. Smith, Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REv. 87, 108 n.28 (1940) where
author collects cases he has classified as supporting the proposition that recovery
has been allowed for neuroses which plaintiff has sustained as a result of being led
by the physician's mode of treatment to believe he has a serious or permanent in-
jury, e.g., cardiac neurosis, fixations of serious injury, and neurasthenia.
25. 264 N.Y. 267, 269, 190 N.E. 487, 488 (1934).
26. PROSSER, ToRTs § 37 (2 ed. 1955).
27. "The liability to cancer must necessarily have a most depressing effect upon
the injured person. Like the sword of Damocles, he knows not when it will fall."
Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 159 N.C. 327, 331, 74 S.E. 885, 886 (1912).
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cerophobia, the existence of which was attested to by a neuro-psychiatrist.
The dissenting Justices indicate that they would grant recovery if the de-
velopment of cancer had been a probability instead of a mere possibility.
But it would seem that the question of probability or possibility, at most,
should bear only on the credibility of the plaintiff's testimony.28 By the
decision in the instant case, control. over fictitious claims has not been re-
linquished but may be exercised by the court through its control over the
adequacy of the evidence, and by its power to review the amount of the
jury's award.
Herbert H. Brown
TORTS-GUEST STATUTE-OWNER OF AUTOMOBILE Is GUEST ON
MUTUAL PLEASURE TRIP.
Phelps v. Benson (Minn. 1958)
This was a tort action,1 brought in Minnesota, against the operator
of plaintiff's automobile for personal injuries and property damages sus-
tained by plaintiff when his automobile, in which he was riding and de-
fendant driving, was involved in an accident occurring in South Dakota.
The parties, who were friends, decided to take a long motor trip as their
vacation, agreeing to use plaintiff's car because it was in better condition
than defendant's. There was also an agreement that the expenses of travel,
such as gas, food and lodgings, were to be shared evenly, with plaintiff,
however, paying for all major car repairs. In a special verdict, the jury
found that the defendant was negligent, but that plaintiff had not given
compensation for the ride; judgment was therefore entered for defendant
on the ground that plaintiff was a guest within the meaning of the South
Dakota guest statute,2 and had failed to prove that his injuries were caused
by the wanton and wilful misconduct of the defendant as required by that
statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed, holding
that plaintiff, although owner of the car was defendant's guest. The court
reasoned that the providing of the car by the plaintiff was not compensa-
tion, but, in a mutual pleasure trip such as this, it was a mere act of hos-
pitality. Phelps v. Benson, 90 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. i958).
28. See note 19 supra.
1. The action was consolidated for trial with a wrongful death action by the
trustee for the heirs and next of kin of plaintiff's wife who was killed in the same
accident.
2. S. D. COD § 44.0362 (1939). "No person transported by the owner or oper-
ator of a motor vehicle as his guest without compensation for such transportation
shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury,
death, or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the
willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator . ... "
3. Phelps v. Benson, 90 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1958).
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Guest statutes provide that an operator of a motor vehicle owes his
rider a lower standard of care when the rider has not given any conpensa-
tion for the transportation. 4 Those acts of hospitality which are part of
the normal courtesies of the road are generally not considered compensa-
tion.5 In applying the term guest to an owner who has consented to be
driven by another, the courts distinguish between actions by the owner
against his driver and actions by the owner against third parties.6 In the
latter instance, the majority of courts hold that there is a presumption of
an agency relationship between the owner and his driver, causing the
negligence of the driver to be imputed to the owner in actions by the owner
against third parties.7 If this agency presumption is rebutted, the owner
is often referred to as a guest of the driver. 8 In actions by the owner against
the driver of his car, the owner, absent a guest statute, may recover dam-
ages sustained as a result of the negligence of the driver.9 This is so even
though an agency relationship exists, since the master of a principal may
recover for torts committed against him by his agent. 10 When the accident
occurs where a guest statute is in force, the courts have almost uniformily
held that the owner is not a guest of the driver within the meaning of
the statute, but that he is a passenger." The courts have reasoned that
the very act of furnishing the vehicle is itself compensation rendered to
the driver in return for the ride.' 2
Although the circumstances of the trip in the instant case would seem
to indicate a relationship based more on hospitality than on compensation,
the providing of the means of transportation by the owners is a tangible
contribution to the driver and should be deemed compensation within the
meaning of the statute, particularly when the owner is to pay for all major
car repairs.' 8 Some courts further reason that where an owner sues the
driver of his car, there is a danger of collusion between the owner and
driver against the insurer, an evil which the guest statute was designed
to prevent.' 4 To include another class of persons within the scope of the
4. See, e.g., Mayer v. Puryear, 115 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1940) ; Boyd v. Mueller,
320 Ill. App. 303, 50 N.E.2d 847 (1943); O'Hagan v. Bryon, 153 Pa. Super. 372,
33 A.2d 779 (1943).
5. Ibid.
6. Lorch v. Elgin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952); Beam v. Pittsburg Ry.,
366 Pa. 360, 77 A.2d 634 (1951).
7. See McCramie v. Moorehead, 131 Cal. App. 2d 877, 281 P.2d 542 (.1955);
Fisch v. Waters, 136 N.J.L. 651, 57 A.2d 471 (1948); Bell v. Jacobs, 261 Pa. 204,
104 At. 587 (1918).
8. McNett v. Volfi, 205 Cal. 89, 269 Pac. 932 (1928) ; Christensen v. Hennepin
Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943).
9. Webb v. Elmire Water, Light R.R. Co., 144 Misc. 506, 258 N.Y.S. 892 (Sup.
Ct. 1932) ; Dosher v. Hunt, 243 N.C. 247, 90 S.E.2d 374 (1955).
10. Urquhort v. McEvoy, 204 Misc. 426, 126 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
11. Ahlgren v. Ahlgren, 152 Cal. App. 2d 723, 313 P.2d 88 (1957) ; Glen Hill v.
Connecticut, 121 Conn. 102, 183 Atl. 379 (1936) ; Naphtalin v. Lafazan, 7 Misc. 1057,
165 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sup. Ct. 1957) ; Lorch v. Elgin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952).
12. Ibid.
13. See Phelps v. Benson, 90 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Minn. 1958).
14. Id. at 537.
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guest statute because of the danger of collusion seems unfortunate since
the efficacy of the guest statutes in preventing collusion has never been
persuasively demonstrated.1" If there is going to be collusion, it is difficult
to believe that the parties will not assume the relationship the law requires. 16
Even if it could be said that there has been collusion between the owner
and driver against the insurer under the guest statutes, this can probably
be attributed to the fact that there has been less recovery; there is no
evidence that the relative proportion of collusion to recovery has declined.17
Because in most jurisdictions there is a tendency to strictly construe the
scope of the guest statutes, it is doubtful that the decision in the instant
case will be followed to any significant degree.' 8
Peter G. Nyhart
TORTS-PENAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA-AVAILABILITY OF A CIVIL REMEDY.
Tynes v. Gogos (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. 1958)
The plaintiff, a white woman, and her husband, a negro, while attempt-
ing to dance in the restaurant and dance hall owned by the defendant,
were told by defendant that mixed dancing was not permitted. When plain-
tiff protested this order, the defendant made insulting and abusive remarks.
The plaintiff sought damages based on anti-discrimination laws' of the
District of Columbia contending that the words and actions of the defend-
dant caused her to suffer humiliation, embarrassment, anguish and anxiety.
The Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint by the trial court, and held that the anti-
discrimination laws of the District of Columbia were municipal ordinances,
penal in nature, and could not serve as a basis for a civil remedy. Tynes v.
Gogos, 144 A.2d 412 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958).2
As a general rule a municipal corporation cannot promulgate a civil
remedy for an individual by municipal ordinance, unless a cause of action
already exists either at common law or by statute in the jurisdiction where
15. HARPR AND JAMSS, Tug LAW Op TORTS 961 (1956).
16. Ibid.
17. See Comment 2 S.D.L. Rv. 70.
18. McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. 2d 279, 70 P.2d 909 (1937); Dobbs v. Sugioka,
117 Colo. 218, 85 P.2d 784 (1947) ; Kitchens v. Duffield, 83 Ohio App. 41, 76 N.E.2d
101, aff'd, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79 N.E.2d 906 (1948) ; Milkovich v. Biene, 371 Pa. 15,
89 A.2d 320 (1952) (the Pennsylvania court applied the Ohio guest statute).
1. D.C. CODX § 49-2901 at 2911 (Supp. VI, 1951). These acts, make it a mis-
demeanor if a restaurant owner refuses "to sell or wait upon any respectable well
behaved person, without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
They further provide for fines upon conviction but are silent as to civil remedies.
2. Tynes v. Gogos, 144 A.2d 412 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958).
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the municipality is incorporated 3 The reason for the rule is that the power
to enact a new civil remedy is retained by the national or state govern-
ments when they create the municipal corporation. In Bain v. Ft. Smith
Light and Traction Co.,4 the court held that a city had no power to create
a new cause of action by ordinance because the state had not delegated
that authority, but if the power to pass such ordinances had been delegated,
then a civil remedy could have been created. 5 Because of their sovereign
power the federal or state governments, by legislation, can create a new
cause of action expressly,6 or the right can arise by implication from a
statute penal in nature.7 However, if a law imposes only criminal sanc-
tions but is enacted for the protection of a certain class of persons the courts
will grant a civil remedy in the absence of contrary implications.8 This
principle was applied in Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways,9
where the plaintiff, a negro passenger on the plane of the defendant, was
not allowed to re-board the aircraft after a stopover. The court allowed
a civil action based on unjust discrimination where the statutes provided
only a criminal penalty, reasoning that the laws involved were enacted
for the benefit of passengers as a class.
The relevant anti-discrimination laws were enacted by the Legislative.
Assembly of the District of Columbia. 10 These laws should not come under
the general rule enunciated for municipal corporations because Congress
made no reservation of power as to the Legislative Assembly of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, as is usually done by a state when it creates a municipal
corporation; on the contrary, Congress extended the law-making authority
of the Legislative Assembly to all rightful subjects of legislation." It is
anamolous to reason, as the instant court has, that when enacting laws
statutory in nature the Assembly has the power of a state to create a new
type of relief whereas when it enacts a law in the nature of a municipal
3. 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 22.01 (3d ed. 1949).
4. 116 Ark. 125, 172 S.W. 843 (1915). Accord, Heeney v. Sprague, 11 R.I.
456 (1877).
5. Hayes v. Michigan Cent. Ry., Ill U.S. 228 (1884). A municipal ordinance,
silent as to civil relief, was allowed as a basis for a cause of action because the city
had the power under its charter to protect persons from injury by railroads.
6. Ewing v. Resher, 176 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1949); In re International Re-
insurance Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 34, 48 A.2d 529 (1946).
7. Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (Mass. 1949); Mezullo
v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 118 N.E.2d 356 (1954).
8. RtSTAUMtNT, TORTS § 286 (1934).
9. 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956). Accord, General Teleradio v. Manuti, 284 App.
Div. 400, 131 N.Y.S.2d 365, (1st Dep't 1954).
10. This body was created by 16 STAT. 419 (1871), and replaced by a three man
commission appointed by the President. 18 STAT. 116 (1874). This latter act has
also been repealed.
11. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953). The
Supreme Court compared the law making powers of the Legislative Assembly to
those of the territories of the United States and said that the Assembly's legislative
authority "covers all matters, 'which within the limits of a state, are regulated by
the laws of the state only."' District of Coumbia v. John R. Thompson Co., supra
at 106.
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ordinance it does not.1 2 It would have been proper to find that regardless
of how these laws are classified they should create a new cause of action
if the Legislative Assembly so intended. The anti-discrimination laws in
the instant case were enacted with only penal provisions but one of their
purposes was clearly to protect patrons of restaurants as a class.' 3 Since
it would appear that the Legislative Assembly had the authority to enact
legislation creating a civil remedy, and the anti-discrimination laws here
involved were enacted to protect a class, the plaintiff should be permitted,
as a member of that class to use them as a basis for a civil remedy.
Joseph P. Kelly
TORTS-RECOVERY FOR MENTAL DISTURBANCE-NECESSITY OF IMPACT.
Bosley v. Andrews (Pa. 1958)
The defendant's cattle strayed on to the plaintiff's farm as they had
done many times before, and as the plaintiff was attempting to drive them
off, the defendant's bull charged at her. The bull was distracted from its
pursuit of the plaintiff by a barking dog; but the plaintiff, as she was at-
tempting to escape from the bull, collapsed and suffered a heart attack.
The plaintiff sued in tort' for permanent injury to her heart allegedly
caused -by the shock she suffered in her encounter with the bull. The
plaintiff's doctor testified that in his opinion the heart attack was the re-
sult of an existing coronary deficiency triggered by the plaintiff's running
from the bull and her fear of being gored. A non-suit was entered against
the plaintiff and was sustained by the supreme court, two Justices dissent-
ing, which held that there can be no recovery for injuries caused by shock
and fright without an accompanying physical injury or impact. Bosley v.
Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).2
Historically, courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for mental
suffering caused by another's negligence because of the difficulty of prov-
ing the alleged injury.' The tort action of intentional interference with
peace of mind has met with the same obstacle. 4 However, where a de-
12. Tynes v. Gogos, 144 A.2d 412, 417 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958).
13. See: Indritz, Post Civil War Ordinances Prohibiting Racial Discrimination
in the District of Columbia, 42 Gao. L.J. 179 (1954).
1. The plaintiff also sued for crop damage caused by the trespassing cattle of
the defendant and received a judgment for $179.99.
2. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
3. See Victorian Rys. Comm'n v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222 (P.C. 1888).
4. Some jurisdictions will allow recovery for interference with peace of mind
resulting from the defendant's wilful and malicious conduct when the plaintiff's mental
anguish produces a physical injury. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38
Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W.
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fendant's negligent conduct has brought about a direct physical injury,
all courts will permit inclusion of the injured party's accompanying mental
suffering in a determination of the measure of damages. 5 Furthermore,
courts have seen fit to permit recovery for a subsequent measurable in-
jury which has been caused by a psychic stimulus such as fright if, at
the time the plaintiff experienced fright, the defendant's negligence had
caused the plaintiff to suffer a direct physical injury.6 However, some
jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, are reluctant to go further and allow
compensation for injuries resulting from shock or mental suffering alone
without an accompanying direct injury or impact. 7 Denial of recovery is
generally based either on the reasoning that the defendant has not breached
a duty to the plaintiff8 or that the plaintiff's injury is too remote to have
been proximately caused by the defendant. 9 Courts that require evidence
of an impact have found a slight touching to be sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirement even though the real harm resulted from the injured party's
mental state and was not caused by the touching. 10 And some courts find
that if one person's negligent activity creates a dangerous situation and
another, reacting spontaneously in a foreseeable manner, is thereby physi-
cally injured, the necessity of impact is waived; that is, even though there
is no direct impact the court will consider the physical injury as the neces-
sary impact, and the injured party will be compensated for his physical
damages, and in addition, the accompanying nervous shock and fright."
Thus, one who, while waiting for an elevator, was so frightened by the
noise and vibration of an elevator door falling into the shaft, that she
fell and suffered bodily harm was compensated upon proof of the property
814 (1926); Matheson v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 137 S.C. 227, 135 S.E. 306
(1926). But see Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948).
Liability for such malicious conduct has been more readily imposed on certain
economic groups (landlords and bill collectors) or when a common law duty has
been breached, e.g., common carriers. Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105
F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P.2d 696 (1948)
Humphrey v. Michigan United R.R., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N.W. 447 (1911).
5. See, e.g., Lowenthal v. Mortimer, 125 Cal. App. 2d 636, 270 P.2d 942 (1954);
Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945).
6. Freedman v. Eastern Mass. Street Ry., 299 Mass. 246, 12 N.E.2d 739 (1938);
Samarra v. Allegheny Valley Street Ry., 238 Pa. 469, 86 At. 287 (1913); Hess v.
American Pipe Mfg. Co., 221 Pa. 67, 70 Atl. 294 (1908).
7. Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 322 Pa. 333, 185 Atl. 744 (1936); Morris
v. Lackawanna & Wyoming Valley R.R., 228 Pa. 198, 77 Atl. 445 (1910); Chittick
v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 Atl. 4 (1909) ; Huston v. Borough
of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022 (1905).
8. Ewing v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 At. 340 (1892).
9. Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164, 17 At. 604 (1889).
10. Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1954) ; Hess v. Phila-
delphia Transportation Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948).
11. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Harriss, 121 Md. 254, 88 Atl. 282 (1913)
Howarth v. Adams Express Co., 269 Pa. 280, 112 Atl. 536 (1921). In the latter
case, a woman was ascending the stairs of her home when a truck collided with the
outside of the house. Due to the shock and fright, she loss her balance and fell down
the stairs, sustaining a back injury. The court allowed recovery although there was
no physical impact between the tortfeasor's instrumentality and the plaintiff.
In the instant case the plaintiff's physical injury was from the fright alone, not
from a physical mishap such as falling down stairs.
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owner's negligence even though her fright was unaccompanied by an im-
pact.1 2 The trend is toward repudiation of the requirement of impact. 13
In the jurisdictions which no longer insist on impact, nonetheless, a person
seeking recovery must have been within the range of foreseeable physical
danger, and the injuries sustained must have been of the type that a nor-
mally constituted person would have sustained had there been direct bodily
contact.' 4 Even in those jurisdictions which no longer insist upon impact,
it is almost universally held that the injury must have been caused by the
apprehension of one's own danger and not concern over the safety or well-
being of another.' 5 In constrast with the split of authority over the neces-
sity of impact, courts have generally denied recovery in negligence actions
for mental disturbance alone, unaccompanied by either a direct or conse-
quent physical injury.' 6
In some of the jurisdictions that require a direct injury or impact
as a condition to recovery it is argued that a relaxation of the rule would
open a floodgate of fictitious claims. 7 However, there is little evidence of
an increase in such claims in the states which permit compensation in a
situation similar to the instant case.' 8 Claims of injury from mental dis-
turbances are subject to the strict standards of proof that apply to direct
physical injury.19 The policy argument as to difficulty of proof that was
applicable when the impact rule was formulated20 would appear to have
lost most of its force because of modern medical investigations into the
nature and effects of physical and mental disturbances. An absolute appli-
cation of the impact rule in the Pennsylvania cases has had harsh conse-
12. Mundy v. Levy Bros. Realty Co., 184 App. Div. 467, 170 N.Y. Supp. 994
(2d Dep't 1918).
13. Of those jurisdictions which have taken a definite stand, thirteen require
a contemporaneous injury or impact. Twenty-two states no longer require an im-
pact. See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. R. 193, n. 31, 32 (1944).
14. Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Frazee v.
Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935).
15. Kelly v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App. 2d 356, 65 P.2d 914 (1937) ; Cote v. Litawa,
96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W.
497 (1935). But see Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atd. 182 (1933); Ham-
brook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141.
16. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843
(1952); Kuhr Bros. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954); Memphis
St. Ry. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917). Cf. Gefter v. Rosenthal,
384 Pa. 123, 119 A.2d 250 (1956).
17. "It requires but a brief judicial experience to be convinced of the large pro-
portion of exaggeration, and even of actual fraud, in the ordinary action for physical
injuries from negligence; and if we open the door to this new invention the result
would be great danger, if not disaster, to the cause of practical justice." Huston v.
Borough of Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 550-51, 61 Atl. 1022-23 (1905).
18. See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MicH. L. R. 497
(1922).
19. See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. R. 193 (1944).
20. The landmark cases are: Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47
N.E. 88 (1897) ; Mitchell v. Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1897);
Victorian Rys. Comm'n v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222 (P.C. 1888).
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quences,21 as indicated by Mr. Justice Musmanno in his dissent in the
instant case.2 2 It is admitted that the plaintiff's encounter with the bull
was the proximate cause of her injury.23 If, instead of being diverted, the
bull had grazed the plaintiff slightly, the impact rule would have been
satisfied and, according to the majority of the court, the plaintiff could
have recovered. Yet the plaintiff's damages and her burden of proof would
not have changed. Perhaps an exception to the impact rule could be formu-
lated in a situation involving absolute liability, such as where the injury
is caused by trespassing domestic animals, as in the instant case.2 4 Such
an exception would not appear to be in conflict with the language of the
Pennsylvania decisions.2 5 However, the requirement of impact, having
only the strength of stare decisis in its favor, should be rejected since the
reason for the rule has disappeared.
John J. Guilfoyle, Jr.
TORTS-UsE op EXPLOSIVES-PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW NEGLIGENCE IN
SEISMOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS.
Klostermann v. Houston Geophysical Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)
Plaintiffs, landowners, brought an action for damages allegedly sus-
tained to their homes because of vibrations caused by defendant's discharge
of high explosives in the performance of seismographic operations in con-
nection with its mineral explorations. The trial court sustained exceptions
to plaintiffs' pleadings because they asserted a cause of action grounded
solely upon liability without fault. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed and held that recovery for damage resulting from seismographic
operations must be grounded upon negligence, and not on the rule of lia-
bility without fault, even though such operations require the use of high
explosives. Klostermann v. Houston Geophysical Co., 315 S.W.2d 664
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958). 1
21. See Morris v. Lackawanna & Wyoming Valley R.R., 228 Pa. 198, 77 At].
445 (1910); Ewing v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 Atl. 340 (1892);
Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164, 17 Atl. 604 (1889).
22. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263, 271 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
23. Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263, 269 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
24. Such an exception is implied in the dissent in the superior court opinion.
Bosley v. Andrews, 184 Pa. Super. 396, 410, 135 A.2d 101, 108 (1957).
25. "It is true that if the owner of any animal, having it in his possession, which
is vicious, allows such animal to run at large, then the owner is liable for any damage
which may ensue. . . ." Hilton v. Overly, 69 Pa. Super. 348, 349 (1918). See also
Rossell v. Cottom, 31 Pa. 525 (1858) ; Ramsey v. Martin, 45 Pa. Super. 645 (1911);
Troth v. Wills, 8 Pa. Super. 1 (1897).
1. Klostermann v. Houston Geophysical Co., 315 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958).
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The theory of strict liability, or liability without fault, as first enunci-
ated in Rylands v. Fletcher,8 makes one who keeps something ultra-
hazardous on his land strictly responsible for damage caused by its escape
therefrom. The doctrine was not generally accepted by American courts.3
However, the states that rejected the case frequently reached similar re-
sults on similar facts on the theory of nuisance. 4 In those states which
accepted the Rylands case, while damages from flying debris were recover-
able on a theory of strict liability, damages from vibrations and concussion
were not.r Today the majority of courts have done away with this dis-
tinction6 and, under one label or another, allow recovery for damages from
such hazardous activity as blasting within such close proximity to another's
property as to cause substantial damage thereto.7 Texas courts now flatly
reject the doctrine of strict liability and predicate liability upon negligence8
in the absence of facts so obvious as to constitute a nuisance as a matter
of law.' In the old case of Cisco & N. E. Ry. v. Texas Pipe Line Co., where
damage was caused by flying debris as the result of defendant's blasting
operations, there was recovery in the absence of wilful misconduct or neg-
ligence even though the work was being done by an independent contractor
because, as the court said, "the work was inherently dangerous."' 1 Dam-
2. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
3. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tgx. L. Rev. 399 (1942). The dictum of
Lord Cairns in Rylands v. Fletcher, supra note 2, was that the rule of strict liability
would not apply to a natural use of land. This caused confusion as some courts
held this to be mere dicta while others felt that the rule of strict liability would
be too harsh without such a limitation.
4. PROSSVR, Tiin LAW O5 TORTS 333 (1955).
5. Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Donaldson, 231 Ala. 242, 164 So. 97 (1935);
Bacon v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 109 Kan. 234, 198 Pac. 942 (1921) ; Williams
v. Codell Construction Co., 253 Ky. 166, 69 S.W.2d 20 (1934); Dolhan v. Peterson,
297 Mass. 479, 9 N.E.2d 406 (1937); Jenkins v. Tomasello & Son, 286 Mass. 180,
189 N.E. 817 (1934) ; Whitla v. Ippolito, 120 N.J.L. 354, 131 Atl. 873 (1926) ; Booth
v. Rome W. & 0. Terminal Ry., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E. 592 (1893) ; Indian Territory
Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rainwater, 140 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
6. See Fairfax Inn v. Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. W.Va. 1951);
Brilton v. Harrison Const. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W.Va. 1948); Richard v.
Kaufman, 47 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1942) ; McGrath v. Baisch Bros. Const. Co.,
7 Cal. App. 2d 573, 46 P.2d 981 (1935); McKenna v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 104 Cal.
App. 538, 286 Pac. 445 (1930); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliot & Watrons Eng.
Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951) ; Baker v. S.A. Healey Co., 302 Ill. App. 634,
24 N.E.2d 615 (1939) ; Louden v. Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106 N.E. 970 (1914) ;
Tibbetts v. Benedict, 128 Okla. 106, 261 Pac. 551 (1927) ; Federoff v. Harrison Const.
Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949) ; Hickey v. McCabe, 30 R.I. 396, 75 Atd. 404
(1910) ; B. Schade Brewing Co. v. Chicago M. & P.S. Ry., 79 Wash. 651, 140 Pac.
897 (1914).
7. Baker v. S.A. Healey Co., 302 Ill. 634, 24 N.E.2d 615 (1939); Brown v.
Lunder Const. Co., 240 Wisc. 122, 2 N.W.2d 859 (1942); RnSTAT MENT, TORTS
§§ 519-24 (1938). See, e.g., Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 142 N.E.2d 347 (Mass. 1957) ;
Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944), Note,
40 11. L. Rev. 278 (1945) ; Baer v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 131 Pa. Super. 309, 200
Atl. 190 (1934), aff'd, 3 A.2d 349 (1938) ; Whitla v. Ippolito, 102 N.J.L. 354, 131
Atl. 873 (1936) (dictum).
8. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1936);
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Lambert, 222 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
9. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., supra note 8.
10. 240 S.W. 990, 992 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
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RECENT DECISIONS
age from vibration and concussion caused by blasting did not have to be
of a permanent character but it had to be substantial, as it did not con-
stitute a nuisance as a matter of law." In Seismic Explorations v. Dobray,12
the court said that where damage to plaintiff's land was caused by defen-
dant's use of explosives, it was for the jury to determine whether the dam-
age was substantial enough for it to be said that the blasting was inherently
dangerous within the rule of the Cisco case. In making such a determina-
tion, the fact that the business of the defendant contributes to the welfare
and prosperity of the community is not controlling.'
In the instant case the court held that Texas would not include cases
of isolated explosions within a doctrine on strict liability whether it is
called absolute liability, nuisance or is given some other label. 14 But the
court does discuss the possibility of recovery on a nuisance theory.' 5 They
would qualify recovery on such a theory, however, by requiring that the
nuisance be of a permanent character.' 6 In asserting this requirement of
permanency, the court relies on decisions' 7 where relief was granted on
nuisance theory but where the facts were such as showed a recurring or
permanent interference with plaintiff's enjoyment of his property. How-
ever, while these cases cited happened to involve instances of recurring
and permanent interference, the courts there laid down no requirement of
permanency, and there is ample authority in Texas supporting the position
that as long as the damage is substantial, there is no requirement of per-
manency. 18 In requiring proof of permanency the court has left the plain-
tiffs with extremely limited chances of recovery since seismographic opera-
tions are by nature temporary. Other cases indicate that res ipsa loquitur
receives a narrow application in Texas cases of this nature" and proof
of negligence becomes very difficult. Texas has taken a much criticized
position2 0 which other oil-producing states have not felt compelled to
follow. 21
Edward T. Bresnan
11. Dallas v. Newberg, 116 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
12. 169 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
13. King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 1946).
14. Klostermann v. Houston Geophysical Co., 315 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958).
15. Id. at 667.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. See authorities cited notes 11-13 supra.
19. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Lambert, 222 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
20. See, e.g., PROSSER, ToRTs 79 (1941): Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own
Property as a Justification for Damages to Neighbor, 17 CoL. L. Rzv. 383 (1917) ;
Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting, 33 HARv. L.
Rxv. 322 (1910).
21. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928) ; Berry
v. Shell Petroleum Co., 140 Kan. 947, 33 P.2d 953 (1934) ; Helmes v. Eastern Kansas
Oil Co., 102 Kan. 164, 169 Pac. 208 (1917). Contra, Constantin Refining Co. v.
Martin, 155 Ark. 193, 244 S.W. 37 (1922); Gulf Pipe Line Co. v. Sims, 168 Okla.
209, 32 P.2d 902 (1934).
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